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In search of an optimal design  
for European gas markets 
D 
uring the last ten years, European gas 
markets have gone through profound 
restructuring processes. Initially ambi-
tious, regulatory targets from the European 
Commission (EC) boiled down to a very basic 
introduction of competition and liberalisa-
tion in the form of the first Gas Directive. 
Since then, the EC has accelerated the reforms 
and deepened competition by progressively 
releasing new directives, regulations and 
guidelines, while at the same time remaining 
resolute during the energy sector inquiry. 
Since the beginning, attempts to liberalise 
European gas markets have faced strong op-
position and resistance from the gas industry 
and industry-oriented governments, aiming 
to maintain the status quo of the market 
organisation, while leaving energy policy as a 
national issue.  
 
Clash of industry visions 
Gas reform is accompanied by a clash of in-
dustry visions. Reformers, such as the EC, 
argue along the lines of the structure-
conduct-performance paradigm of industrial 
organisation studies. &ey claim that liberal-
ised markets reduce monopoly rents and that 
consumer demand will ensure the necessary 
infrastructure is in place in a timely manner.  
In contrast, opponents argue that liberal-
ised markets do not provide enough incen-
tives to ensure a sufficient level of invest-
ments. As a result, this line of argument sug-
gests that underinvestment might result in a 
failure to meet the security of supply obliga-
tions that regulatory authorities are supposed 
to guarantee. Another prominent argument 
against the breaking up of integrated energy 
companies, that is, ownership unbundling, is 
related to the evolving demand side competi-
tion that characterises the political economy 
of international energy markets (Birol 2008). 
Furthermore the concentration of reserves in 
a few gas-producing countries, often linked to 
state-owned gas companies, alongside the 
growing demand in consuming countries, 
increases the negotiation power of the natural 
gas exporting companies vis-à-vis importing 
companies and countries. Accordingly a frag-
mented market structure, with relatively 
small companies and limited purchasing 
volumes, will most probably attract few natu-
ral gas contracts at favourable prices. &is 
reasoning leads to a call to maintain or create 
market power through national or European 
champions.  
Despite the different visions, practitioners 
and academics involved in energy governance 
tend to have a common goal: they are all in 
search of the optimal market design. To ad-
dress this concern, let us start by reviewing 
the current status of European gas market 
regulation and then consider some of the 
obstacles to defining an optimal market de-
sign for European gas markets.  
 
European gas market  
regulation in a nutshell 
Market harmonisation and integration were 
the key drivers behind the European gas re-
forms which aimed at creating a Europe-wide 
level playing field. However European legal 
provisions gave considerable leeway to mem-
ber states in establishing their own national 
regulatory regimes. As a consequence, the 
reform resulted in heterogeneous regulatory 
regimes across Europe. Recent research, pub-
lished with the Gas Programme of the Ox-
ford Institute for Energy Studies, analysed in 
detail the envisaged convergence of national 
regulatory regimes. &is trend study took the 
European Union’s Directives and preference 
statements as a basis to determine a best-
practice model in terms of regulation-for-
competition and developed a methodology to 
measure the member states’ progress towards 
this best-practice (Haase 2008). In reality, 
reform in the old member states seems to be 
becalmed. &e gas reform has resulted in 
widespread application of the demanded, as 
well as voluntary, regulatory instruments such 
as regulated third party access, entry-exit tariff 
structures, capacity provisions to prevent 
capacity hoarding, the so-called use-it-or-lose-
it provision and so forth. Other instruments, 
however, enjoy less popularity. &ese include 
gas release programmes and the separation of 
the trade and network arms of integrated 
utilities in the form of ownership unbundling 
to prevent cross-subsidies and anti-
competitive behaviour.  
By 2005 only seven of the old member 
states had released gas formerly contracted by 
the incumbent onto the market. Two years 
later, only 10 out of 27 European countries 
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had implemented ownership unbundling.  
Not surprisingly, ownership unbundling 
became one of the most contested measures 
that triggered the public debate accompany-
ing the third energy package. Paradoxically 
the liberalisation of European gas markets has 
translated into the re-regulation of the sector. 
New governance arrangements are a central 
part of the gas reform on community, na-
tional and firm levels. Since 1998 the regula-
tory landscape across Europe has been trans-
formed into a multi-authority structure for 
which the regulatory rules have been rewrit-
ten. National regulators, competition au-
thorities and ministries, and their European 
equivalents, newly evolving European regula-
tory bodies such as the European Regulators’ 
Group for Electricity and Gas, institutions 
like the Madrid Forum and industry associa-
tions form a complex system within which 
gas market regulation is evolving.  
&e third energy package shows the gov-
ernance structure to be in flux. If ownership 
unbundling is rejected, the most likely solu-
tion would seem to be the Independent Sys-
tem Operator (ISO) approach. Under this 
option, vertically integrated firms retain own-
ership of their pipelines and storage assets but 
hand over their management to an ISO to 
be established in each member state. Unlike 
the ownership unbundling option, the ISO 
option would be accompanied by a require-
ment to comply with a ten-year investment 
plan that would be proposed by the national 
energy regulator. Additionally the third en-
ergy package aims at establishing an Agency 
for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators 
(ACER) to extend cooperation among na-
tional regulators. &e ACER should have some 
regulatory powers with regard to cross-border 
issues such as granting exemptions for infra-
structure projects of European interest and 
deciding on a regulatory regime to be applied 
to infrastructure within the territory of more 
than one Member State. Furthermore the 
new agency should oversee cooperation 
among transmission system operators (TSOs) 
in the form of a European network of TSOs, 
whose task may be to develop European grid 
codes and investment plans for interconnec-
tions.  
So far the third package seems to be setting 
up an institutional structure, but without 
clarifying how the competences are divided 
between the new agency and the EC in detail. 
&e EC reserves its right to make ‘substantive 
decisions’ and sees itself specifying the com-
petences of the agency in the form of binding 
guidelines once it is established (EC 2007: 
13). &is ambiguity could become a potential 
source of regulatory uncertainty in the future. 
For the time being, the EC envisages the ex-
tensive use of guidelines, as regulatory tools, 
in proceeding with the regulatory reform 
process. In this way, the EC gains room and 
time for action without launching an exten-
sive legislative procedure which a fourth en-
ergy package would require. In short, Euro-
pean gas market governance is still under 
construction.  
 
Optimal market design 
&e benefits of the gas liberalisation policy are 
highly contested. At the beginning, experi-
ences stemming from the gas reforms in the 
United Kingdom (UK) and the United States 
inspired market designers. However, due to 
the severe malfunctions and overall complex-
ity of the reform, observers sense a growing 
uncertainty as to whether the UK regulatory 
regime is appropriate as a basic model to 
apply to other European countries. Since UK 
natural gas prices have skyrocketed during 
recent winters, the opponents to liberalisation 
have been in the ascendancy. To put it pro-
vocatively, if the basic model is in danger of 
becoming a phased-out model, then we need 
to address the question of what the optimal 
design for gas market regulation in Europe 
might actually be.  
One way to define the optimal market 
design is as the market design that achieves 
the reform objectives in the most optimal 
way. &e goal of the gas reforms is to achieve 
reliable, sustainable and affordable energy for 
all consumers. &e dilemma the reformers 
face is that rarely does a single or even a bun-
dle of regulatory instruments serve all the 
objectives in the same way. On the concep-
tual level, a public regulatory approach tries 
to capture this conflict between objectives by 
distinguishing between first-order economic 
objectives and second-order political objec-
tives. Accordingly specific regulations might 
prioritise either achieving regulation-for-
competition or safeguarding public service 
obligations such as security of supply or cli-
mate change, and this might be at the ex-
pense of the former. &e European energy 
policy strategy does not clearly prioritise their 
three objectives. Only actual choices made in 
the application of regulatory instruments will 
reflect, retroactively, the relative importance 
attached to the objectives. As yet, there are no 
signs of any prioritisation within the Euro-
pean energy strategy. 
Another way to identify well-aligned 
modes of governance is taken from transac-
tion cost theory. In this case, either one com-
pares an idealised type of governance with an 
existing one, or one compares two existing 
ones (or an existing one with a recent histori-
cal example) and studies the effects on per-
formance. &e former is more of a theoretical 
approach favoured by academics, whereas 
practitioners are more prone to compare real 
cases. &e latter would ideally involve a cost 
benefit analysis weighing the administrative 
costs of restructuring to optimise transaction 
costs (transaction cost efficiency) against the 
benefits stemming from an improved eco-
nomic performance (effectiveness). What we 
have already seen is that the administrative 
costs attributed to the implementation of the 
gas reforms are enormous for both the regula-
tory side and for the regulated industry, al-
though one searches in vain for precise figu-
res.  
Reform costs and benefits are rarely esti-
mated and compared. In fact, even when it 
comes to the effect of reforms on economic 
performance our knowledge is very limited. 
Natural gas prices, for instance, are still oil-
indexed. Given the absence of any gas-to-gas 
competition, the effect of liberalisation on 
natural gas prices is unclear. Network access, 
regulated tariffs and incentive regulations are 
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key measures if one is to introduce competi-
tion and reduce monopoly rents. Tariff regu-
lation and incentive regulation encourage 
productive efficiency gains by reducing op-
erational costs. &e possible efficiency gains 
are limited because not all the operational 
costs, which contribute to rising costs, are 
controllable. For instance, the fuel costs for 
running compressors are largely beyond the 
control of firms and member states. &e rela-
tively moderate cost reductions achieved 
compared to the rise in household energy 
bills are rarely confronted with the adminis-
trative costs arising from the regulation itself. 
For this reason, voices are increasingly heard 
demanding a regulatory impact assessment to 
evaluate both the transaction cost efficiency 
and the effectiveness of the reform. 
 
Defining Europe’s investment needs 
in a liberalised gas market 
In its simplest form, security of gas supply is 
achieved when contracted volumes are se-
curely delivered at competitive prices and 
thereby ensure that demand is met in a timely 
manner, now and in future. To safeguard 
security of gas supply, it is generally accepted 
that massive investments are necessary in the 
decades ahead. In the EU-15 countries be-
tween 2001–30, the estimated cumulative gas 
investments will amount to $85–95 billion 
for distribution, $50–75 billion for transmis-
sion, $10–15 billion for storage, $15–20 
billion for liquefied natural gas re-gasification 
(International Energy Agency, 2003: 271). 
&e challenge for the European Union is to 
optimise investment incentives in a liberalised 
market. A crucial, but also very difficult, task 
is to determine an objectively optimised in-
vestment level. In a monopolistic market 
structure, or with a regional market division 
involving a few companies, determining in-
vestment needs is relatively straightforward 
and aligned with the needs of the incumbent 
companies.  
&e traditional way to decrease uncertainty 
has been to integrate vertically along the value 
chain or to establish long-term contracts 
which safeguard the return on investment. In 
a more competitive gas market, problems 
involving collective action arise as several 
shippers and at least one transmission system 
operator have to coordinate their potentially 
conflicting interests. &e need for coordina-
tion exponentially increases if players are 
active in several countries. To try to over-
come or prevent underinvestment in gas 
transmission networks, open-season proce-
dures have been used. During this process, 
capacity requests from shippers are collected 
and the transmission system operator then 
decides, on the basis of this demand, how 
much and what sort of capacity is built and 
when. Only the future will show how suc-
cessful the open-season procedures were in 
optimally matching demand and supply in a 
timely manner. Although open-season proce-
dures do appear to be reasonable responses in 
channelling transport capacity demands to-
wards investments, the structural problem of 
regulatory uncertainty is not fully resolved. 
After an investment is made, the regulator 
may, for instance, decide to revise the incen-
tive regulation (for instance, the allowed rate 
of return) in such a way that the return on 
investment is substantially reduced or even 
turns into a loss.  
&e third energy package goes one step 
further than the open-season procedures by 
involving regulatory authorities more directly 
in the investment planning process. Adopting 
the ISO option, the designated independent 
system operator would need to comply with a 
ten-year investment plan proposed by the 
national regulator. Moreover, through the 
creation of the ACER, the EC aims to improve 
the interconnections among the various na-
tional markets. &e agency will be mandated 
to facilitate exemption decisions concerning 
transnational investment projects. It will also 
review the investment plan that any Euro-
pean network of TSOs is expected to compile.  
 
The bottom line 
In terms of regulation-for-competition, the 
gas market reforms are becalmed in mid-
channel. European gas market regimes have 
not adopted a fully-fledged liberalised market 
design, nor are they still organised according 
to the old model that favoured vertically inte-
grated companies embedded in a monopolis-
tic market structure. Attempts to designate an 
optimal market design, by comparing current 
market designs and their effects on adminis-
trative costs and thus on transaction cost 
efficiency and on effectiveness, are hindered 
because administrative costs and economic 
benefits have not been sufficiently researched. 
Europe-wide regulatory impact assessments 
could fill this gap and highlight ways to fine-
tune or redesign the reforms. Further, it re-
mains unclear how the re-regulation now 
taking place in the course of gas market liber-
alisation will develop. &e third energy pack-
age strives for ownership unbundling in an 
attempt to boost regulation-for-competition. 
However, at the same time, the direct in-
volvement of regulatory authorities, be it in 
form of national regulators or the ACER, in 
the investment planning process can be seen 
as a qualitative move towards a regulation-
for-security-of-gas-supply approach. Al-
though enhanced coordination between regu-
latory authorities and European TSOs across 
Europe promises to alter the incentives for 
investing, considerable regulatory uncertainty 
remains.  
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